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I. INTRODUCTION
In Bartnicki v. Vopper,' the Supreme Court faced a direct "conflict
between interests of the highest order:" the freedoms of expression secured
by the First Amendment and the right to privacy.2 Specifically, the Court
considered the question of whether the First Amendment shields the press
from liability under the federal Wiretapping Act' for disclosing an illegally
intercepted communication received from an outside source. A divided
Court held the Wiretapping Act unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the
case.5 Though termed "narrow," the Court's holding has broad implica-
tions.6 The headline could read "First In Write: Press Rights Prevail Over
Privacy Interests."
The Supreme Court presents two significant statements in Bartnicki.
First, confronted with a direct conflict between privacy and First Amend-
ment concerns, the Court once again declares the First Amendment interests
7first and foremost in importance. Second, because both sides argue core
purposes of the First Amendment, pitting the press freedom to inform the
public on matters of public concern against the individual freedom not to
8
speak, the Court's holding implicitly, if not explicitly, acknowledges a
hierarchy of interests within the First Amendment itself. Thus, in the
aftermath of the Bartnicki decision, freedom of the press triumphs over both
freedom of speech and the right to privacy.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that the First Amendment
does not subject enforcement of a general law against the press to stricter
scrutiny than enforcement of the same law against other individuals or
entities.9 Yet the Court's decision in Bartnicki intimates otherwise. This
1. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
2. Id. at 518.
3. Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Oral Communications Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994).
4. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 517.
5. Id. at 535.
6. Id. at 517.
7. See Id. at 535.
8. Id. at 519-20; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 559
(1985) (holding that the right not to speak serves the same functions as the First Amendment's
affirmative aspects) (citing Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250,255
(N.Y. 1968)).
9. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (asserting that the First
Amendment does not protect the press from breaking laws of general applicability). But see
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (distinguishing speech of
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article explores the Bartnicki holding and argues that the Court's decision
implicitly applies stricter scrutiny to the Wiretapping Act as regards the
press than as regards others. Part II examines the law prior to Bartnicki,
both in terms of the First Amendment and the federal wiretapping statute.
Part Il illuminates the Bartnicki decision. Part IV presents an analysis of
the Bartnicki opinion, focusing on the Court's reasoning and the implica-
tions of the holding. Part V demonstrates why the holding subjects Title III
to stricter scrutiny when the press is involved. Finally, Part VI concludes
that in the aftermath of Bartnicki, protection of privacy interests is
increasingly dependent upon journalistic ethics.
II. INTERESTS OF THE HIGHEST ORDER: THE LAW BEFORE BARTNICKI
In order to assess the significance of the Court's holding, we must
examine the law prior to Bartnicki. Since the Bartnicki Court concludes
that application of the federal Wiretapping Act to the facts of the case
violated the First Amendment, it is imperative to understand both the statute
(hereinafter Title III) and the relevant First Amendment law. This part
begins by addressing the First Amendment concerns raised in Bartnicki.
Then the focus shifts to the sphere of privacy and the protections afforded
under Title Ill. Finally, this part examines the legal interplay between these
two "interests of the highest order."' 0
A. The First Amendment
The First Amendment mandates that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . ."" Political speech is
afforded the broadest protection under the First Amendment because the
overriding concern at its inception was ensuring the "free discussion of
governmental affairs" essential to democracy.' 2 Curtailing this exchange of
ideas is thus an inappropriate "means for averting a relatively trivial harm to
media and non-media defendants in a defamation action); Curtis Publ'g v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130, 150 (1967) (holding that a newspaper publisher has no special immunity from laws of
general applicability to invade rights of others).
10. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518 (referring to freedom of the press and privacy
issues).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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society." 13 Accordingly, the courts have declared laws that abridge the
freedoms of speech or of the press unconstitutional unless they have
concluded that proper justification exists for their enactment. 14
Generally, where the courts have found laws content neutral with only
minimal effects on First Amendment freedoms, they have upheld the laws.
15
Content-neutral laws of general applicability "do not offend the First
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news."' 6  The
government can justify incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms
by showing a sufficiently important interest exists to regulate a "nonspeech"
element. 17  The test, first enunciated in United States v. O'Brien,'8 is
satisfied as long as the law
is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers
an important or substantial government interest; if the governmen-
tal interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.' 9
However, the courts have been reluctant to uphold laws directly
abridging First Amendment freedoms, especially when issues of public
concern are involved. In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., the Supreme
Court reviewed recent decisions and declared, "state action to punish the
13. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927).
14. Id. Traditionally, courts have applied two levels of scrutiny in determining
whether proper justification exists for legislative action abridging these freedoms; intermediate
or strict. The standard of review chosen has generally been based on whether or not the law is
content based, preferring the tougher standard when content discrimination is present. Where
the courts have deemed laws content neutral, they have generally applied intermediate
scrutiny. Thus, two distinct lines of cases have emerged, both of which are implicated in
Bartnicki.
15. If a law discriminates based on content it is subject to strict scrutiny. See United
States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (holding that "a content-based
speech restriction ... can stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny") (citing Sable Communica-
tions of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)). Both Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co.,
443 U.S. 97 (1979), and Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), discussed in the
immediately following paragraphs, involved content-based restrictions.
16. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991).
17. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
18. Id. at 377.
19. Id.
20. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
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publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional
standards.' Ultimately, the Daily Mail Court held a state statute
prohibiting the publication of a juvenile offender's name unconstitutional as
applied by declaring the state's interest in protecting the child's anonymity
22insufficient when weighed against the First Amendment. The Court
concluded that when the press lawfully obtains truthful information about a
matter of public significance, publication of such information is constitu-
tional "absent ... a state interest of the highest order. 23
The general rule of Daily Mail, commonly referred to as the "Daily
Mail principle, 24 is now a cornerstone of First Amendment law protecting
freedom of the press. In fact, the Court reiterated the principle in Florida
25Star. In Florida Star, the Court declared a Florida statute making it
unlawful to publish the name of a sexual assault victim unconstitutional as
26applied. The Court reasoned that the information was lawfully obtained
and the privacy and safety interests asserted by the state were outweighed by
the freedoms secured under the First Amendment. 27 Quoting directly from
Daily Mail, the Court cemented the principle: "'[I]f a newspaper lawfully
obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information,
absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.'''28 But, in
footnote eight of Florida Star, the Court specifically reserved the question as
to whether the press may publish the same information when acquired
29
unlawfully.
B. The Sphere of Privacy.: Title III's Role
Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly establish an
individual right to privacy, the Bill of Rights implies that an individual
sphere of privacy exists that the government may not intrude upon.30  Both
the legislature and the judiciary have recognized this resulting right,
21. Id. at 102.
22. Id. at 104.
23. Id. at 103.
24. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 (1989).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 541.
27. Id. at 540-541.
28. Id. at 533 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co. 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
29. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 535 n.8.
30. Eugene J. Yannon, Privacy Law, 34 MD. B.J. 24, 27 Dec. (2001).
2002]
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described by Warren and Brandeis as the "right to be let alone," 3 as an
important, if not fundamental, interest.32 The scope of this right, though, is
unclear, particularly in light of technological advances that make invasions
33of privacy easier.
Title III protects the individual's sphere of privacy by making it illegal
to intercept, use, or disclose the communications of any person except under
specified circumstances. Protecting privacy was an overriding congres-
sional concern in enacting Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968. 3' The legislature made specific findings that techno-
logical advances in surveillance techniques increased the danger that private
communications "may be open to possible wrongful use and public
disclosure by ... unauthorized private parties." To ensure privacy in
communications, Congress deemed it imperative to "strik[e] at all aspects of
the problem .... Accordingly, Title ll provides a uniform basis for
protecting the privacy interest and broadly prohibits the interception, use,
and disclosure of private communications.
In pertinent part, Title I provides:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any
person who -
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any
other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral,
or electronic communication; [or]....
(c) intentionally discloses or endeavors to disclose, to any other
person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication,
knowing or having reason to know that the information was ob-
tained through the interception of a wire, oral or electronic com-
munication in violation of this subsection; [or]
31. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
32. See generally Yannon, supra note 30, at 28-29.
33. Id. at 26.
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994).
35. S. REP. No. 1097 (1968); reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112.
36. S. REP. No. 99-541, at *3 (1986); reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557;
see also Brief for Petitioners Bartnicki and Kane, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001)
(No. 99-1687, 99-1728); 2000 WL 1280378, at *17.
37. S. REP. No. 1097 (1968); reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2156;
Petitioner's Brief, Brief for the United States, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No.
99-1687, 99-1728); 2000 WL 1344079, at *9.
38. Petitioner's Brief, Brief for the United States, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514
(2001) (No. 99-1687, 99-1728); 2000 WL 1344079, at *5.
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(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire,
oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to
know that the information was obtained through the interception of
a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this sub-
section;... shall be punished .... 39
Title III imposes both civil and criminal penalties on any person in violation
of the statute. 40  Further, it establishes a private cause of action for any
person whose communication has been intercepted, used, or disclosed.4'
C. The Interface Between the First Amendment and Title III
Title III broadly protects the individual's "right to be let alone ' 42 from
interference in private communications. In doing so, it implicates the First
Amendment in two critical ways. First, by augmenting the freedom to speak
privately, Title III protects the First Amendment freedoms of speech and
expression. In this sense, the statute directly fosters First Amendment goals:
"privacy of communications is vital to our society" because it allows for the
"free interchange of ideas and information." 43 By prohibiting the intercep-
tion, use, and disclosure of private communications, Title HI reinforces the
First Amendment right not to speak, "which serves the same ultimate end as
freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect." 44
Second, and ironically, Title I1's use and disclosure provisions have a
potentially chilling effect on the freedoms of speech and the press because
they can function like a prior restraint. It is beyond dispute that prior
restraints pose the greatest threat to First Amendment freedoms. 45 Where
disclosures about issues of public importance are involved, the concern is
heightened since enforcement of Title 111 stands to directly conflict with the
39. § 2511(1)(a), (c), (d).
40. § 2511(4)-(5).
41. § 2520(a). The statute does not provide a private cause of action for "obtaining"
illegally intercepted communications. §§ 2510-2520.
42. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 31.
43. United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 856 (3d Cir. 1978).
44. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985)
(citing Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 1968)).
45. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding
publication of information of great public concern more important than preserving secrecy that
might affect national security in light of the basic rule against prior restraints).
2002]
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46First Amendment's mandate. Enforcement of these provisions against the
press thus inherently raises First Amendment concerns.
"It is beyond question that the First Amendment would not protect the
media [or other] defendants from liability ... [for violating] the interception
or procurement prongs of Title HI. '4 7 Title IlI's interception provision is
clearly constitutional. Both the press and non-media defendants, however,
have challenged the use and disclosure provisions on First Amendment
grounds.49 Where no significant First Amendment concerns have been
raised, the use and disclosure provisions have been uniformly upheld.50 But,
when the disclosures involved matters of public significance, the courts have
been inconsistent in their reasoning and conclusions."
Two circuit court cases illustrate the confusion. Both circuit courts
overturned the holding and rational of the district court below and both were
seeking certiorari from the Supreme Court at the time Bartnicki was decided.
In Peavey v. WFAA-TV, 52 the Fifth Circuit was presented with a "first
impression"53 conflict between the right to privacy arising under Title Ill and
46. See, e.g., id.
47. Peavy v. Harman, 37 F. Supp. 2d 495, 516 (N.D. Tex. 1999) aff'd in part, vacated
in part, rev'd in part by, Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
532 U.S. 1051 (2001).
48. Congressional authority to regulate interstate communications stems from the
Commerce Clause and is generally subject to rational basis review; prohibiting interception of
private communications is a legitimate state end that is directly advanced by the statute.
Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1999), vacated on other grounds by 532
U.S. 1050 (2001).
49. Case law is sparse in this area. Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation,
Construction and Application of Provision of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 (18 U.S. C.A. § 2520) Authorizing Civil Cause of Action by Person Whose Wire, Oral, or
Electronic Communication is Intercepted, Disclosed, or Used in Violation of Act, 164 A.L.R.




52. 221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000). In an earlier case, Natoli v. Sullivan, a New York
court determined that a college newspaper could be held liable under Title III for disclosing
the transcript of a telephone conversation recorded in violation of the statute even if it had
played no role in the illegal interception and the information was of public concern. 606
N.Y.S.2d 504, 507 (Sup. Ct. 1993). The court noted however, that any republication of the
transcript by another media source would not violate the statute as the information was then in
the public realm and thus did not constitute disclosure. Id. at 509.
53. Peavy, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
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the "right of a free press to publish truthful and newsworthy information. 54
The question presented was whether the media defendants could be held
liable under Title III for using and disclosing information of public interest
that they had obtained from a known third party.55 Although the media
defendants knew or had reason to know that the information was initially
obtained in violation of Title Ill, they did not make the interceptions
themselves.56
After an extensive analysis of applicable law, the Fifth Circuit
determined that intermediate scrutiny was the proper standard of review and
found that Title IlI's use and disclosure provisions survived the constitu-
tional challenge. 57 The court reasoned that Title ImI is a content-neutral law
of general applicability designed to serve the important government interest
of privacy in communications and does not burden substantially more speech
58than necessary in furthering the government's ends. The case was
remanded, in part to determine issues of fact pertaining to the level of media
"participation" in the interceptions. 59
In Boehner v. McDermott, the District of Columbia Circuit also
confronted a direct clash between Title II's disclosure provision and the
First Amendment. In a highly publicized case involving the disclosure and
subsequent publication of Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich's illegally
54. Id. at 515. The trial court distinguished the statutory right to privacy arising under
Title HI from the "constitutional right... 'to be let alone' from government intrusion into
personal and intimate decisions and beliefs." Id. at 517. Applying strict scrutiny, the court
held Title I unconstitutional as applied to the media defendants who had published truthful
information that had been acquired by a third party in violation of the statute. Id. The court
reasoned "that the information provided to the media involved matters of public significance"
and the information was "lawfully obtained by the media." Id. Thus, the trial court found the
media's use and disclosure of the information protected under the First Amendment absent a
"state interest of the highest order." Peavy, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 517. The statutory privacy
interests violated here, the court explained, could be protected by imposing liability under
Title III to the known third party who disclosed the information to the press. Peavy v. Harman,
37 F. Supp. 2d 495, 526 (N.D. Tex. 1999). This is ultimately what the Supreme Court held in
Bartnicki. See discussion infra Part III.B.
55. Peavy, 221 F.3d at 180.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 193. The court overturned the lower court's determination that Title II was
unconstitutional as applied as well as its use of strict scrutiny as the standard of review. Id. at
194. The Bartnicki dissent essentially agreed with this court's reasoning. See discussion infra
Part III.D.
59. Peavy, 221 F.3d at 194.
60. 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
20021
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intercepted cellular phone conversation, the circuit court found that it was
the defendant's conduct that gave rise to liability under Title m. 61 Even
assuming some speech element was present, the court concluded that the less
exacting "O'Brien framework [was] the proper mode of ... analysis .' 62
Applying the O'Brien test, the court concluded Title 111 was constitutional as
applied to the non-media defendant who had not himself intercepted the
conversation but knew it was illegally obtained when he provided it to the
press. 63 The court, though, distinguished the non-media defendant from the
press, indicating that "[w]hether the statute would be constitutional as
applied to a newspaper who published excerpts from the tape-who, in other
words, engaged in speech-thus raises issues not before us."
64
When considering the clash between Title III's use and disclosure
provisions and the First Amendment, the courts were clearly struggling to
find the proper standard of review. Given the importance of these "interests
of the highest order," it is not surprising that the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Bartnicki to resolve the conflict.65
Ell. BARTNICKI V. VOPPER
In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court was presented with the issue
left unresolved in Florida Star, namely the scope of constitutional protection
afforded to speech that discloses truthful information of public importance
61. Id. at 467.
62. Id. The District of Columbia Circuit rejected the lower court's application of the
Daily Mail principle as well as the finding that the provision violated the First Amendment.
Id. at 476. The circuit court found the Daily Mail and Florida Star line of cases inapplicable
since the defendant was well aware of the illegality of the tapes when he took possession of
them. Id.
63. Boehner, 191 F.3d at 477-78.
64. Id. The court noted that the defendant did not "stand in the shoes of the
'newspaper' in Florida Star" and that the defendant's disclosure to the press was not the
equivalent of the newspaper's publication. Id. at 472. The dissent objected vehemently to this
distinction, explaining that "First Amendment protections.., extend to those who speak and
those who write, whether they be press barons, members of Congress, or other sources." Id. at
484 (Sentelle, C.J., dissenting). The media was not sued in this case. Karen N. Fredericksen,
The Supreme Court, the Press, and Illegally Recorded Cellular Telephone Calls, HUM. RTs.,
Fall 2001, at 17, 19 (2001).
65. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). The Supreme Court let the Peavy
decision stand in the aftermath of Bartnicki. Peavy, 221 F.3d at 158. At the same time it
rendered the Bartnicki decision, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Boehner
decision. Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, vacated, and
remanded, 121 S. Ct. 2190 (2001). See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
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"unlawfully obtained. 66  The actual question the Court considered is a
narrower version of Florida Star's footnote eight:67 "Where the punished
publisher of information has obtained the information in question in a
manner lawful in itself but from a source who has obtained it unlawfully,
may the government punish the ensuing publication of that information
based on the defect in a chain? ' 68 A divided Supreme Court answered
"no !"6 9
A. The Facts
The facts giving rise to this issue of first impression occurred in the
contentious context of local union negotiations.70 Petitioner Bartnicki, the
chief negotiator for the local school board, called petitioner Kane, president
of the local union, from her cellular telephone. 71 They engaged in a lengthy
• • 72
conversation about a proposed strike. The call was intercepted and
recorded by an unidentified person who then anonymously placed the tape in
the mailbox of Jack Yocum, head of a local taxpayers organization.73
Yocum recognized the voices on the tape and knowing or having reason to
know it was illegally obtained, played the tape for the school board.74 He
also delivered it to res pondent Vopper, a radio commentator known for his
criticism of the union.
The unknown source initially made and disclosed the recording in
violation of Title III. 7 6 The recording contained unsettling remarks made by
Kane concerning the school board's intransigence: "If they're not gonna
move for three percent, we're gonna have to go to their, their homes ... To
blow off their front porches, we'll have to do some work on some of those
66. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529. The question was also reserved in Landmark
Communincations, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837 (1978).
67. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529 (construing the issue narrowly "consistent with [the]
Court's repeated refusal to answer categorically whether truthful publication may ever be
punished consistent with the First Amendment.").
68. Id. at 528 (quoting Justice Sentelle's dissent in Boehner, 191 F.3d at 484-85).
69. Id. at 535.
70. Id. at518.
71. Id.
72. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518.
73. Id. at518-19.
74. Id. at 519.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 523.
2002]
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guys."' 77 Though Vopper knew or had reason to know that the conversation
had been illegally intercepted, he played excerpts from the tape on his
78public affairs show. Subsequently, Vopper and other media sources
79repeatedly rebroadcast the contents of the tapes.
Bartnicki and Kane filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania against Yocum, Vopper, and the radio
stations, alleging violations of Title Il's use and disclosure provisions and a
similar state statute.80 The District Court denied cross-motions for summary
judgment and then certified two questions for interlocutory appeal to the
Third Circuit. 81 First, whether imposing liability on the media defendants
for using and disclosing the contents of the illegally intercepted tape violates
the First Amendment, and second, whether imposing liability on Yocum for
disclosing the tape to the media violates the First Amendment. 82
When the Third Circuit Court of Appeals granted review the United
States intervened to defend Title 111 pursuant to statutory right. 8' The Third
Circuit upheld the lower court's denial of summary judgment in the Yocum
case, but reversed the denial as to the media defendants. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals reasoned that the wiretapping statutes were content neutral
and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny. But the court determined that
both the state and federal statutes "fail the test of intermediate scrutiny and
may not constitutionally be applied to penalize the use or disclosure of
illegally intercepted information where there is no allegation that the
defendants participated in or encouraged that interception., 86 The court
remanded the case with instructions to grant the media's motion for
87summary judgment. The Third Circuit denied the petitioners' ensuing
motions for rehearing and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 88
77. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518-19.
78. Id. at 519.
79. Id.; see discussion infra note 52.
80. Id. at 514, 519; see discussion infra note 52.
81. The questions were certified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Bartnicki, 532 U.S.
at 521.
82. Id.
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (2000) (allowing the government to intervene in any
action "wherein the constitutionality of any Act of Congress affecting the public interest is
drawn in question.").
84. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 129 (3d Cir. 1999).
85. Id. at 123.
86. Id. at 129.
87. Id.
88. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 522 (2001).
[Vol. 27:387
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At the outset, the Court acknowledges this case presents a "conflict
between interests of the highest order-on the one hand, the interest in the
full and free dissemination of information concerning public issues-and on
the other hand, the interest in individual privacy, and more specifically, in
fostering private speech." 90 Carefully considering the interests at stake, the
Court is "firmly convinced" that the First Amendment affords protection to
the respondents' disclosures.9I Thus, the question before the Court is
whether holding the respondents liable under Title III violates the First
Amendment.
92
Before addressing this constitutional question, the Court makes three
critical assumptions.9* First, the respondents played no role in the
interception itself and had no knowledge that it was being made.94 Second,
though the interception was made in violation of Title III, the respondents
lawfully received the information.95 Third, the intercepted conversation
involved "a matter of public concern" and the disclosed statements were
"newsworthy." 96
Turning to the constitutional issue, the Court deems Title III a content-
neutral statute.97 Though characterizing the use provision as a regulation of
conduct, the Court finds the disclosure provision a "regulation of pure
speech," analogizing it to the delivery of a pamphlet or a handbill.98 Citing
the Daily Mail principle as well as the primacy of the basic rule against prior
89. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer joined in the opinion,
written by Justice Stevens. Id. at 516. Justice Breyer authored the concurring opinion, joined
by Justice O'Connor. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist drafted the dissenting opinion, joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas. Id.
90. Id. at 518.
91. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518.
92. Id. at 525. The Court draws "no distinction between the media respondents and
Yocum" in this regard. Id. at n.8.
93. Id. at 525.
94. Id.
95. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525.
96. Id.
97. The Court reasoned that the communications are singled out because they are
intercepted; the statute thus distinguishes them "by virtue of the source, rather than the subject
matter." Id. at 526.
98. Id. at 526.
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restraints on publication, the Court concludes that strict scrutiny must be
applied. 99
The Court identifies two government interests supporting Title I: the
interest in deterring interceptions and "the interest in minimizing the harm to
persons whose conversations have been illegally intercepted."' 00 The Court
assumes that these interests justify the disclosure provision when applied to
an "interceptor's own use" or disclosure of information.'0 ' But, the Court
asserts it does not follow that "punishing disclosures of lawfully obtained
information of public interest by one not involved in the initial illegality is
an acceptable means of serving" the same ends.1
0 2
The Court quickly dismisses the government's deterrence interest as
"plainly insufficient" to prohibit the disclosure of "public information" since
the government can better serve this interest by increasing the penalties on
interception itself. °3  It finds the second interest, minimizing harm,
considerably stronger since the disclosure of illegally intercepted private
communications could serve to inhibit private speech that is essential to the
functioning of a democratic society.' °4 The Court acknowledges that the
disclosure can be more invasive of privacy than the initial interception itself,
yet concludes that where sanctions on the publication of truthful information
of public concern are involved, privacy must "give way."' 0 5
The Court cites its opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan, reaffirming
the "general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is
secured by the First Amendment."'' 0 6 Recognizing that "neither factual error
nor defamatory content, nor a combination of the two, sufficed to remove the
First Amendment shield from criticism of official conduct,"' 7 the Court uses
"parallel reasoning" and holds Title III unconstitutional as applied to the
facts of the case. IN
99. Id. at 527-28 (referring to New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971), where the Court deemed the public's right to know superior to privacy interests).
100. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 532.
104. Id. at 532-33.
105. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534.
106. Id. (citing 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)).
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C. The Concurring Opinion
Asserting that the decision does not afford "a significantly broader
constitutional immunity for the media," the concurring Justices stress the
narrowness of the Court's holding.' 9  Where competing constitutional
interests are at stake, the concurring Justices find the standard of strict
scrutiny inapplicable, preferring a balancing approach." 0 Balancing the
competing right to privacy with the First Amendment, given the specific
facts of this case, the concurring Justices nevertheless find Title lfl
unconstitutional as applied."'
The concurring Justices stress that Title IlI's direct restriction on speech
is necessary." 2  Since the threat of widespread dissemination creates a
powerful disincentive to speak, the government has a substantial interest in
broadly prohibiting the interception of private communications." 
3
Nevertheless, the concurrence concludes that Title III's disclosure provision
disproportionately burdens freedom of the press under the specific facts of
the case.' 14
Wary of creating a public interest exception to the statute,'15 the
concurring Justices emphasize that the petitioners "had little or no legitimate
interest in maintaining the privacy of the particular conversation."" 6 The
petitioners were contemplating a wrongful act that might have threatened the
safety of others. 1 7  Moreover, having voluntarily engaged in a public
controversy, the petitioners were "limited public figures. ' 18 The concur-
rence stresses that they thus had a more limited interest in privacy than
persons discussing purely personal matters "and the public interest in
defeating those expectations is unusually high."''9
109. Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring).
110. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 541 (Breyer, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 537 (Breyer, J., concurring).
113. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer fears a broad reading of the case
will inhibit legislatures from flexibly responding to advancing technology that threatens
privacy. Id. at 541 (Breyer, J., concurring). He also urges legislatures to encourage privacy-
protecting technology. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 541 (Breyer, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring).
117. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
118. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
119. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 540 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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D. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting Justices fear that the Court's opinion diminishes the
purposes of the First Amendment by inhibiting the speech of millions of
Americans, particularly in light of advancing technology.12 0 Finding "scant
support, either in precedent or reason" to apply strict scrutiny, the dissent
would apply the O'Brien test to Title Ill since it is a content-neutral law of
general applicability that serves to foster both the right to privacy and
freedom of speech. The dissent distinguishes the Daily Mail line of cases
because the laws they implicated regulated the content or subject matter of
speech.122 Moreover, the dissent argues that unlike the laws under scrutiny
in the Daily Mail line, Title ll's disclosure provision does not inhibit
publication of information already in the public domain. 123  The dissent
focuses heavily on the statute's scienter requirement and argues that Title 111
does not operate as a prior restraint.124
Deeming the disclosure provision critical to achieving the government's
goals, the dissent thus finds Title I1 not only content-neutral, but narrowly
• 125
tailored to prohibit the disclosure of illegally intercepted conversations.
Stressing that the First Amendment also protects the right not to speak, the
dissent contends that "[tihe Constitution should not protect the involuntary
broadcast of personal conversations" even when the conversants are public
figures discussing public matters.116 The dissent affords a sphere of privacy
to public persons which encompasses the "right to have a private conversa-
tion without fear of it being intentionally intercepted and knowingly
disclosed."'' 27 Finding it unfortunate that the Court subordinates this right to
120. Id. at 542 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 544 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
122. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 546-47 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The dissent distinguishes Daily Mail
from the case at bar on three grounds: first, the information there was lawfully obtained from
the government itself whereas here, the private conversations have been intentionally kept out
of the public domain; second, the information in those cases was available to the public before
the media disclosed it; and third, the fear of resulting self-censorship was greater in the Daily
Mail line because Title III provides a scienter requirement and no duty is imposed on the
media to inquire into the source so there is no liability for negligent disclosures. Bartnicki,
532 U.S. at 546-47 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 547 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 548 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 554 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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privacy to the freedom of the press, the dissent would hold the statute
constitutional as applied to the facts of the case.128
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE BARTNICKI DECISION
The rule of Bartnicki is seemingly clear: absent an "interest of the
highest order," the First Amendment affords the press the right to publish a
public figure's illegally intercepted "speech" on matters of public concern as
• . . 129
long as it did not participate in the initial interception. Prior to Bartnicki,
the Daily Mail principle required courts to make two determinations when
publishing truthful information.' 30  "[F]irst, whether the information was
lawfully acquired, and second, whether [the publication] addressed a matter
of public concern."''3 Bartnicki shifts the focus exclusively to the second
question. 32 It now appears that the only factor limiting the press's ability to
publish truthful information is whether it addresses a matter of public133
concern. This section begins by considering the Court's reasoning. It
then addresses the ambiguities and likely impact of the decision, finding that
the rule of Bartnicki is not as clear as it seems.
A. The Court's Content-Based Decision
Ironically, in holding a content neutral law of general applicability
unconstitutional as applied, the Court focuses on the content of the
disclosure itself. The Bartnicki decision clearly elevates speech on matters
of public concern above other forms of speech protected under the First
Amendment. 134 Ultimately, it also signals the triumph of press freedom over
privacy interests. 35  Yet, a majority of the Court affords greater weight to
the right to privacy and freedom of speech than the holding suggests. 36 Five
128. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 555 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
129. Karen N. Frederiksen, The Supreme Court, the Press, and Illegally Recorded
Cellular Telephone Calls, HUM. RTS., Fall 2001, at 17, 18.





135. Paul M. Smith & Nory Miller, When Can the Courts Penalize the Press Based on
Newsgathering Misconduct?, COMM. LAW., Summer 2001, at 1.
136. Id. at 28 (noting that five Justices seem willing to hold the press liable for
disclosing the contents of a third party's "illegal interception if the circumstances are
sufficiently different from those presented in this case").
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Justices assert that strict scrutiny is an improper standard of review where
privacy interests conflict with the First Amendment.13 1 Clearly, the two
concurring and three dissenting Justices are troubled by the Court's
reasoning. They have reason to be. The Court's analysis is logically
unsound, but will impact the legal interplay between the right to privacy,
freedom of speech, and freedom of the press in an era where technological
advances increasingly threaten privacy in communications.
1. Pure Speech?
The Court's application of the Daily Mail principle is predicated on its
assertion that Title 111's disclosure provision regulates "pure speech" rather
than expressive conduct. 38  Since the "speech" disclosed by the media
involves a matter of public importance, the Court applies the Daily Mail
principle and renders Title III unconstitutional as applied.' 39 But, it is not
clear at the outset that disclosure of an illegally intercepted communication
is "pure speech" at all within the meaning of the First Amendment.
The Court determines that a Title 1H1 disclosure involves "pure speech"
by analogizing the disclosure to the delivery of a pamphlet or a handbill.' 4°
But the analogy itself is flawed. 14 1 The delivery of a pamphlet or handbill
involves the intentional disclosure of its contents by the author or agents of
the author. 142 Though the disclosure of illegally intercepted communications
likewise provides the recipient the text of the statements, the statements
being disclosed are not initially intended for publication. 43 On the contrary,
these communications occur in private and are meant to remain confiden-
tial. 144
Simply put, it is illogical to term the media disclosure "pure speech."
The broadcast of these communications clearly implicates both the
deliberately private speech of the conversant and the intentional conduct of
137. Id.
138. Bartnicki, 532 U.S at 527.
139. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518 (2001).
140. Id. at 527.
141. Id. at 540 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 541; Brief Amicus Curiae Cellular Tel. Indus. Ass'n at *17, Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1687), available at 2000 WL 1280461 (providing an in
depth analysis of this issue).
144. Even if the petitioners' expectations of privacy were diminished as the
concurrence asserts, they never intended the contents of their conversation to be divulged.
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533.
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the press in disclosing it.1 45  Disclosing the contents of an illegally
intercepted communication is simply not "pure speech" as the Court holds.
Nevertheless, the Court finds this "pure speech" concerns a matter of public
concern and applies the Daily Mail principle. The Court's foundation for
applying strict scrutiny is tenuous.
2. Compelling Speech
As the dissent points out, the First Amendment promotes the voluntary
freedoms of expression. 146 The First Amendment was not ratified to coerce
Americans to divulge their private conversations. 14  The Supreme Court of
the United States recognized this critical distinction in Harper & Row when
it noted that the right not to speak is not only protected under the First
Amendment, but serves the same ultimate purposes as the freedom to
speak. 48  Democracy requires that citizens are afforded privacy to think
creatively and constructively without fear of exposure. 49 Yet, the Bartnicki
Court holds that if the press receives information on a matter of public
concern from an outside source that broke the law to obtain it, then the press
cannot constitutionally be punished for publishing it.' 50 Bartnicki compels
the speech of the victim of the illegal interception.
At the crux of the First Amendment "lies the principle that each person
should decide for himself or herself the ideas or beliefs deserving of
expression."' 5  The Court's analysis ignores a core purpose of the First
Amendment by holding that public persons have abandoned their right to
converse privately when discussing matters of public concern. 15 Over a
century ago, Justices Warren and Brandeis surmised that as life becomes
more complex and civilization advances, privacy becomes more essential to
145. Amicus Brief at *17, Bartnicki (No. 99-1687).
146. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 553.
147. Id. at 540.
148. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985).
149. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
150. The Court has upheld press freedom to publish material unlawfully divulged by a
source, but in Bartnicki, the disclosed information was never in the public domain in the first
place, nor was it leaked by a source that rightfully had access to it. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532
U.S. 514, 528 (2001) (distinguishing Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) and New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) on the basis of the government's
ultimate authority over the divulged information and the prior restraint imposed).
151. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
152. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 539.
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the individual. 5 3 Could they ever have imagined the modern threats to
privacy in communications? The Court's decision compels speech,
diminishes the right to speak privately, and thus undermines an essential
element of democratic society that the First Amendment was designed to
promote.
3. Ignoring the Facts
The Bartnicki Court acknowledges that disclosing "the contents of a
private conversation can be an even greater intrusion on privacy than the
interception itself."154 Yet the Court holds that although the media can be
held liable under Title III for illegally intercepting a communication, it
cannot constitutionally be punished for disclosing that same information
unless it was involved in the initial illegality.' 55 The Court reaches this
conclusion in part by finding that Title III's disclosure provision has no
significant deterrent effect on the initial interception.' 56 Instead, the Court
argues that punishment of the offender is the usual method of deterring
unlawful conduct. 57 The Court suggests that the government further its
interest in privacy of communications by imposing stiffer sanctions on
violations of the procurement prong. 58
While the Court limits the holding to the facts of the case, the Court's
outright rejection of the deterrence rationale 59 ignores the facts of the ver
case it is deciding. In Bartnicki, the initial offender is unknown.
Imposing stiffer sanctions on the initial offender is meaningless. The
government cannot further its objectives by punishing the source. As the
dissent argues, preventing the offender "from enjoying the fruits of the
crime" is a "time-tested" solution to deterring illegal acts that are difficult to
detect. 
161
153. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 31, at 196.
154. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533.
155. Leading Case, supra note 132, at 406, 413.
156. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 530.
160. Id. at 518.
161. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 550 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)




Nova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 10
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol27/iss2/10
Spungin
The Court justifies its own dismissal of the facts simply by stating
"surely this is [an] exceptional case., 162 Bartnicki may indeed present an
unusual set of facts, but this does not excuse the Court from addressing the
facts before it. Privacy interests suffer as a result; 163 permitting the press to
disclose the contents of an illegally intercepted communication increases the
demand for illegal interceptions. This is especially true on matters of public
concern where the interceptor's primary objective is likely disclosure of the
information itself. Failing to address the facts of the case at bar, the Court
seriously undermines Title lil's mandate of maintaining privacy in
communications.
4. A Tale of Two Evils
The Court's consideration of the use and disclosure provisions is
equally troublesome. While deeming disclosure "pure speech," the Court
expressly states that the use of illegally intercepted communications
constitutes conduct. '64 Since laws regulating conduct are generally subject
to the less exacting O'Brien test,165 imposing liability on the media for using
an illegally intercepted communication is more likely constitutionally
permissible than punishing disclosure of the same information. Arguably,
the speaker's sphere of privacy is more directly invaded by a verbatim
broadcast of private communications than by the media's use of the
information to investigate a story.
The result is illogical because the Court effectively permits the press to
commit the greater of two evils. If Vopper had used the intercepted
information as an investigative lead and never disclosed the actual contents
on the air, the Court's reasoning implies that the press could be held liable
for violating Title llt's use provision without offending the First Amend-
ment.166 Yet, the Court holds that punishing Vopper's verbatim broadcast of
the same information violates the First Amendment and is therefore
unconstitutional.167 The Court's reasoning permits the press to disclose the
162. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 531.
163. Conflict is created when a "general principle of law is applied to a case, although
not applicable to the particular facts of that case." Sacks v. Sacks, 267 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla.
1972).
164. "Unlike the prohibition against the 'use' of the contents of an illegal intercep-
tion... [disclosure] is not a regulation of conduct." Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526-27.
165. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
166. See Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (labeling Title III's
disclosure provision as conduct and finding it withstands the O'Brien test).
167. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 532.
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conversation, while prohibiting it from engaging in the lesser evil of use. In
the aftermath of Bartnicki, it appears that the media is safer directly invading
a public figure's privacy than searching for a less intrusive means of
presenting the same story. Surely, the Court could not have intended this
illogical result.
The Court's reasoning is illogical and inconsistent. The underlying
premise of the Court's opinion, that this disclosure is in fact "pure speech,"
is not justified. The Court not only fails to acknowledge that the First
Amendment is designed to promote the voluntary freedoms of expression,
but ignores the facts of the case at bar as well as the contradictory implica-
tions of its reasoning. Based on this defective foundation, the Court builds a
hierarchy of First Amendment interests, elevating the freedom of the press
above the freedom of speech and the right not to speak. By focusing so
heavily on the freedom of the press to publish truthful information of public
concern, the Court undervalues both the right to privacy and the First
Amendment freedom of speech.
B. Implications of Bartnicki v. Vopper
The Court's reasoning, flawed as it is, will affect the outcome of future
conflicts involving privacy rights and First Amendment freedoms; Bartnicki
is the law. Bartnicki clearly signals a triumph for press freedom to publish
truthful information on matters of public concern, but the extent the Court
has extended this freedom is unclear.168 Since the Court leaves important
issues unresolved, the effect of the decision is dependent upon judicial
interpretation. Although the decision is termed narrow, in an era of
advancing technology privacy interests will increasingly collide with
freedom of the press and Bartnicki's impact is potentially far-reaching.
1. Unresolved Issues
Bartnicki leaves important questions unanswered. The Court makes
three critical assertions that render the full significance of the decision
unclear; the speakers are public figures, the media had no involvement in
and no knowledge of the initial interception, and the information broadcast is
of public concern. It is unlikely that future cases will present such pure
factual scenarios. The legal interplay between privacy interests and freedom
168. The concurring Justices claim "the Court's holding does not imply a significantly
broader constitutional immunity for the media." Id. at 536.
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of the press is thus dependent upon how the judiciary interprets these factors,
_ ./ • • 169
including the weight afforded to the concurring opinion.
First, the Bartnicki holding is predicated on a finding that the speech
disclosed was made by public figures. The concurring Justices in Bartnicki
emphasize that because Bartnicki and Kane are public figures, their privacy
expectations are diminished. If the courts give weight to the concurring
opinion, the press may be afforded even greater constitutional protection
where public officials are involved. 70  Unfortunately, the Court does not
address whether the holding governs disclosures of private individual's
communications.' But by the same reasoning, the courts may afford the
press less constitutional protection when the speech of private figures is at
issue.
Second, the Court assumes that the media had no involvement in or
knowledge of the initial interception. Clearly, if the press actively partici-
pates in the interception, it can be held liable under Title mI's procurement
and disclosure prongs. But, the Court does not determine the threshold level
of press involvement necessary to trigger liability for disclosure. Can the
press be held liable under the disclosure prong while indirectly participating
in the initial interception? 172 Is mere knowledge that the interception is
taking place sufficient to trigger liability? 173 Bartnicki leaves these questions
unanswered. The scope of protection Bartnicki affords the press will remain
unclear until these issues are litigated.
1 74
Finally, and perhaps most critically, the Court assumes that the
intercepted conversation involves a "matter of public concern."' 175 Yet as the
dissent points out, "'public concern' is an amorphous concept that the Court
does not even attempt to define."' 176 The opinion indicates that the speaker's
interest in maintaining privacy does not determine whether a matter of public
concern exists, but fails to clarify what makes a matter newsworthy.1
77
How publicly important must the disclosure be to place the press under
the protective umbrella of the decision? The Court notes that domestic
169. Smith & Miller, supra note 135, at 29.
170. Frederiksen, supra note 129, at 19.
171. See id.
172. See discussion infra Part IH.B.2.
173. Frederiksen, supra note 129, at 19. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,
194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999), suggests knowledge is not enough to trigger press liability for
publication. Smith & Miller, supra note 136, at 30.
174. See discussion infra Part HII.B.2.
175. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001).
176. Id. at 542 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
177. Smith & Miller, supra note 135, at 30.
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gossip does not fall within the ambit of the decision, but what if this gossip
is about a public official? 78 The Court distinguishes trade secrets from
matters of public importance, yet what if the secrets involve illegality?
179
Was the disclosure in Bartnicki of simple public importance or, as the
concurring Justices argue, of unusual public significance? Bartnicki
provides no guidance, leaving the line between issues of private and public
concern as ambiguous as ever.'80
The Court elevates matters of public concern above other forms of
protected speech without presenting coherent guidelines for determining
when the holding actually applies to a media disclosure. "[G]iven the
malleability of the public concern standard and the ease of ex post
explanations" the Court might have effectively answered the one question it
• 181
repeatedly refuses to answer categorically; whether truthful publication
may ever be punished consistent with the First Amendment."' Bartnicki
intimates that the press cannot be constitutionally prevented from publishing
truthful information, regardless of the source. 183  But if the concurring'
rationale is followed, press freedom and privacy interests may be afforded
variable protection based on the status of the speaker and the public
significance of the disclosed speech. 84
2. Resolution in the Aftermath? Peavy and Boehner
Shortly after rendering the Bartnicki decision, the Court denied
certiorari in Peavy and granted review in Boehner. 85 In the long term,
litigation of these and other cases will help resolve the ambiguities of the
Bartnicki decision.186 For now, analyzing the Court's certiorari decisions
provides insight into the scope of Bartnicki.187  The Court's certiorari
178. Id. at 28-29.
179. Id.
180. Leading Cases, supra note 132, at 415.
181. Id. at 416.
182. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527.
183. Leading Cases, supra note 132, at 416.
184. Concurring opinions can be significant. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
185. Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158, (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
1051 (2001); Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, vacated,
and remanded, 121 S. Ct. 2190 (2001).
186. Frederiksen, supra note 129, at 18.
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decisions suggest three things. First, the threshold question is whether
matters of public concern are disclosed. The more newsworthy the matter,
the higher the government's interest must be to justify regulation. Second,
and related, when the speech disclosed is that of a prominent public official,
stricter scrutiny is required. Third, any indication of press entanglement may
remove the press from Bartnicki's protective umbrella.
The United States Supreme Court allowed the Peavy decision to stand
despite the fact that the lower court applied intermediate, rather than strict
scrutiny. 188 This seemingly inconsistent denial can perhaps be explained by
189the possibility that more than "pure speech" is at issue in Peavy. Unlike
Bartnicki, this case implicates the concept of press involvement, requiring a
factual analysis of whether the media "obtained" the interceptors. 190 The
United States Supreme Court's denial of review may indicate that when the
press is involved in the illegal interception, Bartnicki does not govern the
outcome at all. Perhaps when the media even indirectly "participates" in the
initial interception, intermediate scrutiny is sufficient.
After granting certiorari in Boehner, the United States Supreme Court
vacated the decision below and remanded it for consideration consistent with
Bartnicki.'9' The vacated opinion applied the O'Brien test and concluded
that Congressman McDermott, a non-media defendant, could be held liable
for disclosing an illegally intercepted communication made by a third party
to the media.' 92 Perhaps the enormous public significance of the disclosure
triggered the United States Supreme Court's remand. 93 Or perhaps it was
because the speech disclosed was that of Newt Gingrich, a prominent public
official. In either case, the remand in Boehner suggests that when matters
are of national significance, the O'Brien test is an improper mode of
analysis. Whether disclosed by the press or by a non-media defendant,
speech, not conduct, is at issue.
The remand of Boehner may be most significant in that the United
States Supreme Court did not reverse the decision below, thereby holding
the non-media defendant to the same standard of review as the media
defendant in Bartnicki. Although the remand indicates that a higher level of
scrutiny is required, it does not demand that the First Amendment must
188. Peavy, 221 F.3d at 181.
189. Frederiksen, supra note 129, at 19.
190. Id.
191. Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, vacated
and remanded, 532 U.S. 1050 (2001).
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triumph when the media is not involved. It remains to be seen whether
McDermott, a non-media defendant, is immune from liability under Title Inl
like the press, or should be held liable for disclosure under a different
rationale.
V. A STANDARD OF ITS OWN?
The Court claims adherence to the general rule that the First Amend-
ment does not subject enforcement of a general law against the press to
stricter scrutiny than would be applied to others.194 In fact, in a one-sentence
footnote, the Court asserts that it "draw[s] no distinction between the media
respondents and Yocum.' ' 195 Thus, the Court does not explicitly hold the
press to a different standard of review. Yet, if the footnote is read literally, it
implies that the disclosure provision is unconstitutional in every instance
when the initial interception is made by an outside party without press
involvement, the disclosure involves a matter of public significance, and the
"speech" disclosed is that of a public figure. The Court's reasoning does not
support such a broad reading.
Logic dictates that the Court's rationale cannot be applied to a non-
media defendant's disclosure. The holding is not only rooted in freedom of
the press, but freedom of the press permeates every aspect of the Court's
analysis. The Court tellingly frames the question presented narrowly in
order to be consistent with its "repeated refusal to answer categorically
whether truthful publication may ever be punished consistent with the First
Amendment."' 196 Publication is defined as "[lthe act or process of publish-
ing" printed material. 97 Publish means "[t]o prepare and issue (printed
material) for public distribution or sale."' 98 When the media institution is
not the disclosing party, there is no publication, rendering the Daily Mail
principle inapplicable to the analysis.
Clearly Yocum's disclosure of the illegally intercepted communication
is substantively identical to the media's, but the form of his disclosure is
distinguishable. Although Yocum is exercising his freedom of speech by
disclosing information to the media, he is not publishing it. His disclosure
does not directly implicate the First Amendment freedom of the press.
194. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001).
195. Id. at 525, n.8.
196. Id. at 529 (emphasis added).
197. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 628 (Williams Morris ed. 2001). This
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Yocum's disclosure to the non-media party does not even indirectly
implicate press freedom. Though Bartnicki does not address the issue of
whether the non-media defendant's liability is dependent upon the endpoint
of his disclosure, applying the Daily Mail principle is clearly inappropriate
when there is no publication.199
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the United States Supreme Court held
that a newspaper publisher has no special immunity from general laws to
invade the rights of others. 2°° Title ImI is a content-neutral law of general
applicability. In Bartnicki, the media respondents invaded the petitioners'
privacy by disclosing their confidential conversations initially intercepted in
violation of Title III. The Bartnicki decision subjects Title III to stricter
scrutiny when applied to the press than as applied to others because the
Daily Mail principle is inapplicable when a non-media defendant makes the
same disclosure. Implicitly, the decision holds the press to a lesser standard
of liability when violating a content-neutral law of general applicability than
it does others. The Court has effectively offended its own rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
Bartnicki clearly signals the triumph of freedom of the press over the
right to privacy and other freedoms of expression protected by the First
Amendment. But Bartnicki also demonstrates the importance of the distinc-
tion between legality and morality. Though it is now legally permissible for
the media to publish a public person's illegally seized speech on a matter of
public concern, it is not necessarily morally justifiable to do so. Despite the
201law, not all journalists would compel speech under the facts of Bartnicki.
Fortunately, morality and legality are not one in the same.
Certainly, journalists balanced the public right to know against the
individual right to privacy before Bartnicki. But as advancing technology
increasingly threatens privacy in communications, Bartnicki creates an
additional ethical dilemma for the media. Currently, many codes of ethics
199. If Bartnicki and Kane had sued only Yocum without suing the media, it is difficult
to imagine that the Supreme Court would have granted certiorari. Unlike Boehner, this case
does not involve matters of national significance or the speech of high-level public officials.
Although acknowledging that Yocum and McDermott technically stand in the same shoes, the
Third Circuit distinguished McDermott's disclosure based on his political motivations and his
potential involvement in the initial interception. Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 129.
200. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
201. Interview with A. Barrett Seaman, Editor Emeritus, Time Magazine, in Ft.
Lauderdale, Fla. (Feb. 14, 2002).
20021
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neglect to even address privacy interests. 202 Competition among journalists
can transform a little irresponsibility into a colossal peril for the individual
right to privacy. Bartnicki proclaims press freedom is first and foremost in
importance. Prominence ought to be accompanied by responsibility. Our
right to privacy depends on it.
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